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REMITTANCES AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Sheilla Nyasha1 and Nicholas M. Odhiambo 
 
 
Abstract  
In this paper, we have empirically examined the impact of remittances on economic growth in 
South Africa over the period from 1970-2017. The study was motivated by the conflicting 
empirical findings that have emerged in the literature on the impact of remittance on economic 
growth in various countries. The study was also motivated by the need to find an empirical 
backing on the assertion that remittances are good for economic growth and can play a key role 
in lowering the inequality levels in developing countries. Using the autoregressive distributed 
lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach, the empirical results, contrary to expectations, have 
revealed that in South Africa, remittances have a negative impact on economic growth, 
irrespective of whether the regression analysis is conducted in the long run, or in the short run. 
The study, therefore, cautions policy makers when it comes to policies related to harnessing 
remittances for economic growth. The study argues that it is not only remittance inflows that 
matter, but also how the remittances are utilised to influence economic growth. 
 
Keywords: Remittances, Economic Growth; South Africa  
 
1. Introduction 
South Africa has been struggling consistently with sustained low GDP growth rates since the 
global financial crisis of 2008. Even before the crisis, the growth rates were unstable, ranging 
between 5% and -2%, with a few outliers with growth rates of 7% (World Bank, 2019). As way 
of reducing unemployment, poverty and inequality levels and grow the economy inclusively, a 
number of policies and initiatives have been introduced in South Africa. Among such policies is 
the National Development Plan (NDP) introduced in 2011 (The National Planning Commission, 
2011). The NDP mapped the growth path of South Africa until 2030, where economic growth is 
expected to grow by 5% per annum and where domestic investment as a ratio of GDP should be 
30%.  
 
                                                          
1  Corresponding author: Sheilla Nyasha, Department of Economics, University of South Africa (UNISA). Email 
address: sheillanyasha@gmail.com .  
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To revive the NDP, the new South African President introduced Job and Investment Summits in 
2018. The country also sent delegates on road shows overseas to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI). All these efforts were towards growing the economy. Surprisingly, no attention was given 
to the role that remittances can play in achieving the national objective, given that the inflows 
had dramatically increased in the recent past. According to Ratha (2012), remittances are second 
to FDI but unlike FDI that succumbs to economic challenges, remittances are resilient to 
economic crises and they remain an important source of external financing for developing 
countries. Although remittances refer to inflows and outflows, in this study, unless specified, 
remittances refer to inflows. 
 
Turning to empirical literature on the impact of remittances on economic growth could not offer 
much help in the case of South Africa because to the best of our knowledge, no study has been 
done on the impact of remittances on economic growth in South Africa despite the increasing 
importance of remittances worldwide and the increased flows into Africa and South Africa in the 
recent past. If there are studies that provided coverage on South Africa, the coverage was indirect 
as the studies focused on remittances and economic growth in Africa (see Fayissa and Nsiah, 
2010; Nwaogu and Ryan, 2015).  
 
Further, among the studies on the impact of remittances on economic growth done in Africa and 
elsewhere, the results have been conflicting – with some studies supporting the positive impact 
of remittances on economic growth (Fayissa and Nsiah, 2010; Yaseen, 2012; Goschin, 2014; 
Matuzeviciute and Butkus, 2016; Meyer and Shera, 2017), and some providing evidence of a 
negative impact of remittances on economic growth (see Chami et al., 2005; Lipton, 1980; 
Ahlburg, 1991; Brown and Ahlburg, 1991), while other studies concluded that remittances have 
no significant impact on economic growth (see Lim and Simmons, 2015; Jouini, 2015; Feeny et 
al., 2014). 
 
The inconsistency in the literature on the impact of remittances on economic growth and the non-
availability of studies done on South Africa on the subject, on the one hand, and the urgent need 
by South Africa to find a lasting solution to chronic low levels of economic growth, on the other 
hand, makes this study important. 
 
Against this backdrop, the objective of this study is to empirically examine the long-run and 
short-run impact of remittances on economic growth in South Africa during the period from 1970 
to 2017. The study used the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach to 
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examine this linkage. This method is preferred to conventional methods as it is easier to compute 
with one equation yet it gives robust results even if some of the variables are endogenous. The 
paper is organised into five sections, where Section 2 analyses the dynamics of remittances and 
economic growth in South Africa; Section 3 reviews the literature on remittances and economic 
growth; Section 4 presents the estimation and empirical analysis techniques; and Section 5 
provides the conclusion.  
 
2. Remittances and Economic Growth Dynamics in South Africa 
Remittances into South Africa have always been overshadowed by remittances from South 
Africa to other countries. As such when a discussion of remittances in South Africa occurs it is 
usually domestic remittances or remittance outflows. This notion is understandable since South 
Africa is the most developed country in Africa and has better opportunities than its African 
counterparts. The country is deemed ‘by far' Africa's richest and most advanced country, 
according to AfrAsia Bank (2017). Its financial sector – both financial intermediaries and the 
financial markets – has no match in Africa; it competes with the top developed countries. 
Therefore, because of its opportunities, South Africa is home to a number of immigrants, with 
75% of them originating from Africa (Statistics South Africa, 2016). Thus, the default topical 
issue on remittances becomes outflows rather than inflows. 
 
Of late, the South African economy has been struggling to sustain a decent level of economic 
growth. The economy has not fully recovered from the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 
2008; hence, economic growth rates have been consistently low while the unemployment rate 
has been consistently high for some time now – currently sitting at 1.4%  and 27.1%, respectively, 
quarter-on-quarter, in the last quarter of 2018 (Statistics South Africa, 2019). Given the 
deteriorating economic fundamentals, coupled with heightened crime and corruption, South 
Africans are slowly finding other countries better destinations to raise their families. These 
destinations are New Zealand and Australia, among others.  
 
From 1998, remittances to South Africa began their ascent, as more and more South Africans 
emigrated, from US$258.6million, equivalent to 0.2% of GDP, to a peak of US$1.2 billion, 
equating to 3% of GDP, 2011 (World bank, 2019). Thereafter, the remittance inflows declined 
gradually to US$755.4 million in 2016, before a mild recovery to US$873.2 million in 2017.  
 
The movement in remittance and economic growth appeared to be in tandem since the late 1990s. 
Between 1998 and 2011, both variables trended upward, only to follow the same downward trend 
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between 2011 and 2017. Whether this trend was coincidental or there exists an underlying 
relationship remains to be tested.  
 
From the economic growth front, South Africa’s economic growth rate from 1970 to 2017 
averaged 2.5% per annum, with the 1970s and the 2000s recording the highest average GDP 
growth rate of 3.3% and 3.6%, respectively. While the 1980s and the 2010’s posted average 
growth rates of 2.2% and 2.0%, respectively, the 1990s was the worst performing decade with 
an average GDP growth rate of 1.4% (World Bank, 2019). Figure 1 tracks the performance and 
growth of the South African economy as measured by the annual growth rate of GDP and 
remittances as proxied by remittance inflow as a percentage of GDP during the 1970-2017 period.  
 
Figure 1: Remittance and economic growth trends in South Africa (1970-2017) 
 
Source: World Bank (2019) 
 
Figure 1 reveals that overall the GDP growth rate for South Africa during the review period was 
unstable. Although the years from 1998 to 2007 experienced buoyant growth, they could not 
reverse the overall downward trend for the whole period, as indicated by the GDP growth rate 
trend line.   
 
3. Literature Review 
According to Fagerheim (2015), the level of remittance flows depends on migrants’ ability to 
remit, their motivation and willingness. While a migrant’s income level and saving capacity 
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determines the ability to remit, the duration of migration and the family situation both at home 
and in the country of destination play a significant role in determining the motivation and 
willingness to remit.  
 
The remittance corridor also has an effect on the level of remittance flows into the country (see 
Carling, 2008; Fagerheim, 2015).  The cheaper and less regulated the corridor is, the higher the 
remittance flows as it becomes relatively easier to remit. 
 
In the event that a remittance corridor is expensive and regulation laden, migrants usually use 
informal channels to remit. These informal channels usually involve sending money with 
relatives going home or with a bus driver in the case where remittance sending and receiving 
countries are bordering each other. Unfortunately, informal remittances go unrecorded. 
Remittances sent through informal channels are termed informal remittances while those sent 
through formal and well regulated channels are called formal remittances. Remittances can also 
be domestic or cross-border or international. The former is when remittance sender and recipient 
reside in the same country but in physically distanced areas and the latter is when the remitter 
and the recipient are in different countries. In this study, focus is on formal cross-border 
remittances.  
 
Theoretically, remittances are good for economic growth. They boost economic activities in 
various ways. They act as a source of funds for investment financing (Catrinescu et al., 2009). 
Even if they are used for consumption purposes, the multiplier effect on aggregate demand boosts 
the economy (see Pradhan et al., 2008, among others). Stimulation of aggregate demand may 
also create employment; hence, theoretical literature views remittances as an avenue for 
employment creation (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development “OECD”, 
2019). Another way remittances can positively impact the economic growth of a nation is through 
human capital investment – where remittances are used for health and education, which results 
in increased levels and quality of human capital in a remittance receiving country (see Barajas et 
al., 2009). Further, Barajas et al. (2009) argues that as remittances are channelled to health and 
education, in the long run the recipient country will have a more skilled and healthier labour 
force. 
 
Although it is commonly agreed that remittances have a positive impact on economic growth, 
Barajas et al. (2009) add a condition under which the former may have a detrimental effect on 
the latter. According to their argument, the more highly integrated an economy is with world 
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financial markets and the more highly developed the domestic financial system, the less likely it 
is that remittance receipts will stimulate investment. Fayissa and Nsiah (2008) also presented 
their argument corroborating Barajas et al.’s condition, though in reverse. They claimed that 
remittances boost economic growth in countries where the financial systems are less developed 
by providing an alternative way to finance investment and help overcome liquidity constraints. 
 
A review of empirical literature reveals that the impact of remittances on economic growth is not 
as obvious as commonly thought. Mixed results have been found by various studies. While the 
most common result is consistent with remittance-economic growth theory, revealing the positive 
impact remittances have on economic growth, other studies, though just a handful, found the 
impact to be negative. Besides these two categories, there is also a section of literature that sees 
the impact of remittances on economic growth as insignificant.  
 
Various channels through which remittances can translate to economic growth have been 
explored. Among them is the view by Fayissa and Nsiah (2010) that remittances positively 
impact economic growth by providing an alternative way to finance investment and help to 
overcome liquidity constraints. On the other hand, Stahl and Arnold (1986) and Goschin (2014) 
argue that the use of remittances for consumption has a positive effect on growth because of their 
possible multiplier effect. 
 
The positive impact of remittances on economic growth finds support from a number of studies. 
These studies include: Fayissa and Nsiah (2010) using panel data covering 36 African countries 
from 1980 to 2004; Yaseen (2012) using panel data from nine countries; Goschin (2014) using 
aggregate panel data that cover ten countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) over the 1995-
2011 period; Cooray (2012) in the case of  South Asia during the period from 1970 to 2008; 
Barguellil et al. (2013), using a modified version of Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) and data 
from 1990 to 2006 for two groups of countries; Imai et al. (2014), covering  Asia and Pacific 
countries using 1980-2009 panel data; Paranavithana (2014), when exploring the effect of 
worker’s remittances on economic growth in Sri Lanka using time series annual data for the 
period 1977-2012; Nwaogu and Ryan (2015) based on 1970-2009 data from 53 African, 34 Latin  
American and  Caribbean countries; Matuzeviciute and Butkus (2016) using  unbalanced panel 
data covering a sample of 116 countries with different development levels over the period 1990-
2014; and Meyer and Shera  (2017), using a panel data set of six high remittance receiving 
countries during the period 1999-2013. 
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On the other hand, the negative impact of remittances on economic growth is supported by studies 
done by, among others, Chami et al. (2005) who found migrants’ remittances to have a negative 
impact on economic growth. Lipton (1980), Ahlburg (1991) and Brown and Ahlburg (1991) 
argued that remittances undermine productivity and growth in low-income countries because 
they are readily spent on consumption and are more likely to be dominated by foreign goods than 
on productive investments. 
 
Besides the two views discussed, there is the third view, which sees no significant impact of 
remittances on economic growth. This view is consistent with studies by Lim and Simmons 
(2015), using 1990-2012 data from the Caribbean Community; Jouini (2015) in Tunisia during 
the period from 1970 to 2010 using ARDL cointegration techniques; and Feeny et al. (2014) 
based on 1971-2010 data from 136 developing countries. 
 
Although the empirical literature on the impact of remittances on economic growth is mixed, the 
scale tilts in favour of the positive impact of the former on the latter. Table 1 summaries the 
empirical literature reviewed in this study. 
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Table 1: A Summary of Studies on the Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth 
 
Author Region/Country of study Methodology Findings 
Fayissa and Nsiah 
(2010) 
36 African countries Panel  Positive 
Yaseen (2012) Nine countries Panel  Positive 
Goschin (2014) Ten countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) 
Panel  Positive 
Cooray (2012) South Asia Time series Positive 
Barguellil et al. (2013) Two groups of countries Panel Positive 
Imai et al. (2014) Asia and Pacific countries Panel  Positive 
Paranavithana (2014) Srilanka TIme series Positive 
Nwaogu and Ryan 
(2015) 
53 African, 34 Latin  American and  
Caribbean countries 
Panel Positive 
Matuzeviciute and 
Butkus (2016) 
116 countries Unbalanced 
panel 
Positive 
Meyer and Shera  (2017) Six high remittances receiving 
countries 
Panel Positive 
Lipton (1980)   Negative 
Ahlburg (1991) Tonga and Western Samoa Survey Negative 
Brown and Ahlburg 
(1991) 
Pacific region - Tonga and Samoa Survey Negative 
Chami et al (2005) 113 countries Panel Negative 
Feeny et al. (2014) 136 developing countries Panel Neutral 
Jouini (2015) Tunisia Time series Neutral 
Lim and Simmons 
(2015) 
Caribbean Community Survey Neutral 
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4. Estimation and Empirical Analysis Techniques 
4.1 Approach Adopted 
In assessing the impact of remittances on economic growth in South Africa, the study utilises the 
autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach (see Pesaran and Shin, 1999; 
Pesaran et al., 2001. This method was found to be the most suitable for the study given the 
numerous advantages it has over the conventional approaches, such as the residual-based 
technique by Engle and Granger (1987) and the Full-Maximum Likelihood (FML) test by 
Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990). 
 
4.2 Empirical Model Specification 
In this study, while economic growth is approximated by the annual growth rate of real GDP, 
remittances are proxied by the ratio of remittance inflows to GDP. This is a commonly used 
measure of remittances as it takes cognisance of country size and is more stable than remittance 
inflows in US dollars or local currency (see Meyer and Shera, 2017). The coefficient of 
remittances is expected to be positive. 
 
To fully specify the model and control for the effects of other key variables that affect economic 
growth, six control variables are added to the remittance-growth model. These are financial 
development, domestic investment, domestic savings, household consumption, trade openness 
and inflation rate. Their selection was purely based on economic theory that acknowledges their 
impact on economic growth and emerging empirical evidence supporting the theory (see Shaw, 
1973; McKinnon, 1973; Ang and McKibbin, 2007; Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn, 2008).  
 
Financial development is proxied by domestic credit to the private sector by banks as a 
percentage of GDP. As the financial sector develops, the economy is expected to grow; hence its 
impact on economic growth is expected to be positive. Domestic investment is measured by gross 
domestic investment as a percentage of GDP. It reflects the level of domestic investment taking 
place in an economy. The a priori expectation is positive so is that of domestic savings, as proxied 
by gross domestic savings as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Household final consumption expenditure as a ratio of GDP is used to proxy the level of 
household expenditure. The more the household spends, especially on durable goods, the more 
the economy expands – hence this variable is expected to have a positive impact on economic 
growth. While trade openness is expected to also have a positive impact on economic growth, 
inflation rate is expected to have a negative impact. The former is proxied by the sum of imports 
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and exports as a ratio of GDP while the latter is approximated by annual percentage changes in 
consumer price index.  
 
The ARDL-based model employed in this study to empirically assess the impact of remittances 
on economic growth, taking into account the explained variables, is expressed as: 
 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝜋0 + ∑ 𝜋1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜋2𝑖∆𝑅𝐸𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
∑ 𝜋3𝑖∆𝐹𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
∑ 𝜋4𝑖∆𝐷𝐼𝑡−𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝜋5𝑖∆𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
∑ 𝜋6𝑖∆𝐻𝐶𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
∑ 𝜋7𝑖∆𝑇𝑂𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
∑ 𝜋8𝑖∆𝐼𝑁𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝜃1𝑦𝑡−1
+   𝜃2𝑅𝐸𝑡−1 +  𝜃3𝐹𝐷𝑡−1 +  𝜃4𝐷𝐼𝑡−1 +   𝜃5𝐷𝑆𝑡−1 +  𝜃6𝐻𝐶𝑡−1 +   𝜃7𝑇𝑂𝑡−1
+  𝜃8𝐼𝑁𝑡−1 +  𝜇𝑡 … … … … … … … (1) 
 
Where: 
y  = economic growth 
RE  = Remittances 
FD  = Financial development 
DI  = Domestic investment 
DS  = Domestic savings 
TO  = Trade openness 
 𝜋0       = constant; 
𝜋1- 𝜋8; 𝜃1- 𝜃8 = respective regression coefficients; 
∆ = difference operator;  
n = lag length; and 
μt  = white noise-error term   
 
Following the ARDL model specified in equations (1) the associated error-correction model is 
specified as: 
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∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝜋0 + ∑ 𝜋1𝑖∆𝑦𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=1
∑ 𝜋2𝑖∆𝑅𝐸𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
∑ 𝜋3𝑖∆𝐹𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
∑ 𝜋4𝑖∆𝐷𝐼𝑡−𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
+ ∑ 𝜋5𝑖∆𝐷𝑆𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
∑ 𝜋6𝑖∆𝐻𝐶𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
∑ 𝜋7𝑖∆𝑇𝑂𝑡−𝑖 + 
𝑛
𝑖=0
∑ 𝜋8𝑖∆𝐼𝑁𝑡−𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
+  ∅1𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1 +  𝜇𝑡 … … … … (2) 
Where: 
ECM   = Error-correction term 
∅  = coefficient of the error-correction term 
All other variables and characters are as described in equation 1.  
 
4.3 Data Source 
The annual time series data, covering the period from 1970 to 2017, utilised in this study were 
sourced from World Bank Economic Indicators (World Bank, 2019).  
 
4.4. Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Stationarity Tests 
Prior to the analysis all the variables in the model are subjected to two stationarity tests –the 
Phillips-Perron (PP) and the Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Square (DF-GLS) unit root tests. 
While in conventional data analysis methods, stationarity tests are mandatory to eliminate 
spurious regressions, in this instance, stationarity tests are only important to ensure that the 
variables are integrated of either order zero or one or both but not higher than one – to fulfil the 
condition of the applicability of ARDL bounds testing approach to data analysis. Table 1 details 
the results of stationarity tests.  
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Table 2: Results of Stationarity Tests  
 
 
 Phillips-Perron (PP) Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least 
Square (DF-GLS) 
Variable Without Trend  Without Trend 
 Variables in Levels First Difference Variables in Levels First Difference 
y -4.630*** - -4.011*** - 
RE -0.755 -4.221*** -1.035 -4.072*** 
FD -1.261 -7.821*** -1.080 -7.863*** 
DI -1.154 -4.551*** -1.459 -4.206*** 
DS -1.234 -5.943*** -0.867 -5.324*** 
HC -1.731 -6.109*** -1.628 -5.803*** 
TO -2.042 -7.661*** -1.847 -6.727*** 
IN -1.985 -7.300*** -1.677 -6.177*** 
Note: *** denotes stationarity at 1% significance level 
 
 
Stationarity test results reported in Table 1 reveal that all the variables are either stationarity in 
levels or after first difference – confirming the suitability of the chosen approach to data analysis. 
Therefore, the study proceeds to the testing of cointegration among the variables in the model 
using the ARDL bounds testing approach.  
 
 
 
4.4.2 Bounds F-Test for Cointegration  
In this section, the long-run relationship between the variables in the specified model is 
examined. 
The null hypothesis of no cointegration, expressed as:  
 
H0: 𝜃1= 𝜃2= 𝜃3= 𝜃4= 𝜃5= 𝜃6 = 𝜃7= 𝜃8 =0  
 
is tested against the alternative hypothesis of cointegration, expressed as:  
 
H1: 𝜃1≠ 𝜃2≠ 𝜃3≠ 𝜃4≠ 𝜃5≠ 𝜃6 ≠ 𝜃7≠ 𝜃8 ≠ 0.  
 
The calculated F-statistic is compared with Pesaran et al.’s (2001) critical values. Cointegration 
of variables is confirmed when the calculated F-statistic is above the upper bound level, leading 
to the rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration. Should the calculated F-statistic fall 
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below the lower bound level, the null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected and it is 
concluded that the variables are not cointegrated. Results of the cointegration test may sometimes 
be conclusive. This happens only when the calculated F-statistic falls within the upper and the 
lower bound levels. The results of the bounds F-test for cointegration in this study are reported 
in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Bounds F-test for Cointegration  
Dependent 
Variable 
Function F-statistic 
 
Cointegration Status 
y F(y|RE, FD, DI, DS, HC, 
TO, IN) 
4.779*** Cointegrated 
 
Asymptotic Critical Values 
 
Pesaran et al. (2001), 
p.300 Table CI(iii) 
Case III  
1% 5% 10% 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
 
2.96  4.26 2.32  3.50 2.03  3.13 
Note: *** denotes statistical significance at 1% level  
 
 
 
As shown in Table 3, cointegration results confirm the existence of a long-run equilibrium 
relationship among the variables in the model. This is confirmed by the computed F-statistic of 
4.779 which is above the upper bound critical value of 4.26, at 1% significance level.  
 
4.4.3 Coefficient Estimation 
Following the establishment of cointegration among the variables, the study proceeds to 
coefficient estimation using the ARDL approach. Optimal lag length of  ARDL(1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) 
was selected based on Akaike information criterion (AIC). Table 4 reports the results of the 
selected model. Panel A of the table shows long-run coefficients while Panel B displays short-
run coefficients. 
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Table 4: Empirical Results of the Estimated ARDL Model 
Panel A: ARDL(1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) – Estimated long-run coefficients [Dependent variable: real GDP 
growth rate (y)] 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
C -19.257 -0.805 
RE -0.490** -2.675 
FD 0.302* 2.276 
DI -0.532*** -3.992 
DS 0.563*** 2.877 
HC 0.234 0.726 
TO 0.218*** 3.372 
IN -0.337*** -2.896 
Panel 2: ARDL(1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) – Estimated short-run coefficients [Dependent variable: real GDP 
growth rate (∆y)] 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio 
RE -0.273*** -2.773 
FD 0.174** 2.215 
DI -0.472*** -4.650 
DS 0.500** 2.649 
HC 0.207 0.698 
TO 0.193*** 3.061 
IN -0.300*** -3.341 
ECM(-1) -0.888*** -6.999 
R-squared  0.728                                                       R-bar-squared    0.670 
F-statistic[Prob]  12.402 [0.000]                                          DW statistic   2.125 
SE of Regression  1.477                                                       Residual Sum of Squares  80.683 
Akaike Info. Criterion -87.195                                          Schwartz Bayesian Criterion  -
95.423 
Note: *, ** and *** denote stationarity at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels respectively  
 
Surprisingly, the regression results reported in Table 4 reveal that the coefficient of remittances 
is negative and statistically significant at 5% and 1% levels in the long run and short run, 
respectively. These results imply that in South Africa, remittances are detrimental to economic 
growth, irrespective of whether analysis is done in the short run or in the long run. Although 
contrary to our expectations, the results are not unusual (see, Lipton, 1980; Brown and Ahlburg, 
1991; Ahlburg, 1991;  Chami et al., 2005). A possible explanation for these results could be that 
most of the remittances to South Africa are used for household consumption purposes, especially 
of non-durable goods, rather than channelled to productive activities that will eventually have a 
positive impact on economic growth. This assertion could be correct as evidenced by household 
consumption that was found to have a statistically insignificant impact on economic growth both 
in the long run and in the short run. Another possible explanation by Barajas et al (2009) is that 
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the more highly integrated an economy is with world financial markets and the more highly 
developed the domestic financial system, just like South Africa, the less likely it is that remittance 
receipts will stimulate investment by relaxing credit constraints. This is echoed by Fayissa and 
Nsiah (2008) who concluded that remittances boost growth in countries where the financial 
systems are less developed. 
 
Other results show that financial development, domestic savings, and trade openness have a 
positive impact on economic growth, as expected – both in the long run and in the short run. The 
outcome that was expected as well was that of inflation, which came out negative – implying that 
inflation rate is negatively related to economic growth and any increases in the former will cause 
the latter to fall. The results also apply irrespective of the time horizon. 
 
However, the results of two variables were unexpected. Household consumption was expected 
to have a positive impact on economic growth in the study country since it is the household final 
consumption expenditure that constitutes over 60% of GDP while domestic investment is just 
about 20% of GDP. Contrary to expectations, household consumption was found to be 
statistically insignificant in explaining economic growth in South Africa. Another unexpected 
outcome was registered by the domestic investment, which was expected to be positive but turned 
out to be consistently negative both in the long run and in the short run. Although these results 
were unexpected in this study, they are consistent with results of other previous studies (see 
Karim et al., 2013, among others).  
 
Nevertheless, the error-correction term was found to be negative and statistically significant as 
expected. This confirms the existence of a long-run equilibrium relationship among the variables 
in the model. As such, should there be a shock in the South African economy the equilibrium 
position will be attained again at a rate of 88.8%. The model was also well specified, as evidenced 
by R-squared of 0.728, implying that 72.8% of variation in the model is explained by the 
variables in the model.  
  
The model was also subjected to a series of diagnostic tests on serial correlation, functional form, 
normality and heteroscedasticity. The model passed all the four tests. Table 5 summarises the 
results.  
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Table 5: Diagnostic Tests 
LM Test Statistic Results  Probability 
Searial Correlation CHSQ(1) 0.987 0.320 
Functional Form CHSQ(1) 0.102 0.750 
Normality CHSQ(1) 3.661 0.160 
Heteroscedasticity  CHSQ(1) 2.351 0.125 
 
As part of model diagnostics, Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals (CUSUM) and the 
Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals (CUSUMSQ) graphs were also used to 
analyse the stability of the model. The results are displayed in Figure 2, and they reveal that there 
is stability and that there is no systematic change identified in the coefficients at 5% significance 
level over the study period. Therefore, based on these graphs, it can be concluded that the 
parameters in this model are stable over the sample period. 
 
Figure 2: Plot of CUSUM and CUSUMQ 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion  
In this study, the impact of remittances on economic growth in South Africa during the period 
from 1970 to 2017 was assessed. The ECM-based ARDL bounds testing approach was used to 
examine this linkage. The study was motivated by the conflicting empirical findings that have 
emerged in the literature on the impact of remittance on economic growth in various countries. 
The study was also motivated by the need to find an empirical backing on the assertion that 
remittances are good for economic growth and can play a role in lowering the inequality levels 
in South Africa. Contrary to expectations, the empirical results of this study revealed that 
Plot of Cumulative Sum of 
Recursive Residuals (CUSUM) 
Plot of Cumulative Sum of 
Squares of Recursive Residuals 
(CUSUMQ) 
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remittances have a negative impact on economic growth in South Africa, irrespective of whether 
the regression analysis is conducted in the long run or in the short run. A possible explanation 
behind these results could be that remittances are channelled towards consumption of non-
durable goods instead of being directed to the consumption of durable goods and to productive 
economic activities. The study, therefore, cautions policy makers when it comes to policies 
related to harnessing remittances for economic growth. The study argues that it is not only 
remittance inflows that matter, but also how the remittances are utilised to influence economic 
growth. Though contrary to expectations, these findings are consistent with some previous 
studies such as those of Ahlburg (1991), Brown and Ahlburg (1991), and Chami et al. (2005), 
amongst others. 
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